Legacy industrial control systems are hard to patch, poorly segmented and difficult to monitor — and they are now a top target. Invitty secures ICS, SCADA and IoT for manufacturing, energy and critical infrastructure across India, using methods proven on hands-on engagements in steel, industrial and critical-infrastructure environments.
Backed by an NVIDIA Connect Program alliance and enterprise deployments across the GCC, Invitty brings production-grade AI — not pilots — to Indian enterprises and corporates, nationwide.
OT Security Capabilities
- OT risk assessment & compliance — IEC 62443 / ISA-99 aligned assessments across management, operational and network controls, with passive configuration review (zero risk to running ICS) and a full risk register.
- Business continuity & disaster recovery — ISO 22301 / 22317 aligned BIA across SCADA, DCS and PLC, with RTO/RPO tiering, DR plans and graduated testing (tabletop to functional failover).
- Network segmentation & architecture — Purdue Model (ISA-95) OT/IT segmentation, zone-and-conduit design per IEC 62443-3-2/3-3, firewall placement, VLAN/subnet strategy and industrial redundancy (MRP, HSR, PRP, RSTP).
- Visibility, implementation & knowledge transfer — IDS design (SPAN/RSPAN/ERSPAN), vendor-agnostic PoC and BoQ, on-site implementation support, as-built documentation and day-2 operations training.
Standards-Aligned, Vendor-Agnostic
Our assessments and designs map to the frameworks Indian regulators and auditors expect — IEC 62443, ISA-95/99, ISO 22301 — and remain vendor-neutral, so you invest in the right controls, not the loudest brand. Deliverables include risk registers, segmentation blueprints, DR runbooks and cutover plans.
Why OT security is not IT security with different cables
Controls that are routine in IT can be unacceptable on a plant floor, and assuming otherwise is how security teams lose the trust of operations.
- Availability outranks confidentiality — stopping a process to remediate a finding may cost more than the finding. Risk is measured in production and safety, not data.
- Patch windows are measured in quarters — and some equipment is under warranty terms that forbid changes. Compensating controls matter more here than patch currency.
- Protocols assume a trusted network — Modbus, DNP3 and several of their siblings were designed without authentication, so a command from the wrong host looks identical to a legitimate one.
- Active scanning can be the incident — some controllers fault when probed. Passive monitoring from a mirrored port is the default starting point, not a fallback.
- Lifecycles run to decades — unsupported operating systems are a design constraint to isolate, not a finding to close.
We work to the Purdue levels and segment between them, so an IT compromise does not reach process control.
Starting with an asset inventory you can trust
Nearly every OT programme we join starts in the same place, because the honest answer to “what is connected?” is usually incomplete. A spreadsheet maintained during commissioning several years ago is not an inventory.
Passive discovery establishes what is actually on the network, what it talks to and which protocols it uses, without sending anything that could disturb a controller. That gives segmentation something to be designed around, and the baseline makes later changes visible: a new device, or an engineering workstation suddenly talking to the internet, stands out only against a known-good picture.
It also reveals the connections nobody documented — a vendor's remote-support link, a contractor's laptop, a bridged office network. These, rather than exotic attacks, are how most OT incidents begin, and they pair naturally with our assessment work on the IT side of the boundary.